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THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH AND THE
RESULTING LEGAL RECOURSE
ABSTRACT
What happens when one’s sensitive information falls into the wrong
hands? With the twenty-first century’s advancement of technology comes
the increasing problem of data breaches wherein sensitive information is
exposed. On September 7, 2017, Equifax, one of three major United States
credit reporting agencies announced one of the largest data breaches in the
history of the United States. The data breach affected approximately 145
million consumers and subsequently a wave of consumer class actions
followed. This Note clarifies why class action lawsuits and arbitration are
not viable legal remedies for massive data breaches where entities like
credit reporting agencies are hacked, and in this instance, where Equifax
was hacked. Moreover, this Note also recommends the creation of an
independent victim recovery fund as a remedy for the Equifax data breach.
The fund would be modeled after other successful victim compensation
funds such as the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and the
Deepwater Horizon Settlement Fund.
INTRODUCTION
Data breaches can be destructive when it comes to impact and legal
recourse. 1 A consumer data breach, where a consumer’s personal and
sensitive information is disclosed, is even more disastrous. 2 The severity
only increases when an agency that is given massive authority and access to
millions of consumers’ personal information is breached. 3 While it is
apparent that additional steps should be taken to stop data breaches from
occurring, due to the steadily increasing rate of breaches and the evergrowing technological world, the reality is that data breaches will continue
to occur. 4 As former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert
Mueller aptly stated, “there are only two types of companies: those that

1. See PONEMON INST., 2017 Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study, INT’L BUS. MACHINES
CORP. (June 2017), https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SEL0313
0WWEN.
2. See Dan Goodwin, Why the Equifax Breach is Very Possibly the Worst Leak of Personal
Info Ever, ARS TECHNICA, Sept. 8, 2017, 2:09 AM, https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2017/09/why-the-equifax-breach-is-very-possibly-the-worst-leak-of-personal-infoever/.
3. Joan Goodchild, Analysis: Why Equifax Breach is so Significant, DATABREACHTODAY,
Sept. 08, 2017, https://www.databreachtoday.com/interviews/analysis-equifax-breach-so-signific
ant-i-3697.
4. See 2017 Data Breaches Hit Half-Year Record High, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR.
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/2017-data-breaches-hit-half-year-record-high/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2018).
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have been hacked and those that will be. And even they are converging into
one category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again.”5
In the case of a credit consumer agency, where the potential exposure is
considerable, the critical issue is: what is the proper legal recourse for
obtaining adequate compensation when a breach occurs? This issue arose,
after Equifax, one of the major United States credit reporting agencies,
revealed a major data breach within its internal system. 6 Consequently, the
data breach exposed approximately 145 million consumers’ sensitive
information. 7
The issue of how to resolve data breach compensation is not new and
presents many difficulties to the legal field. 8 However, with a shift towards
heightened consumer protection with an underlying effort to simultaneously
protect and promote business growth, the question remains as to which
form of legal recourse—litigation, arbitration, or an administrative
remedy—should prevail to achieve such ends.
Part I of this Note explains the general background regarding data
breaches, the shift towards consumer protection, and the effect this shift has
on consumer-business legal disputes. Part II details the massive Equifax
data breach and the immediate class action litigation that followed. Part III
examines the pros and cons of potential remedies for aggrieved data breach
victims: consumer class action lawsuits or arbitration. Part IV concludes
with a recommendation of an administrative remedy to deal with both the
Equifax data breach and other potential major credit consumer agency data
breaches. At bottom, this Note argues that class action litigation and
arbitration are not adequate legal recourse for the Equifax data breach.
Further, this Note proposes the creation of a victim recovery fund that
consumers affected by the Equifax data breach can access to receive
compensation.

5. Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the RSA Cyber
Security Conference in San Francisco, CA (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov
/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies.
6. Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer Information, EQUIFAX
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/20107/09-07-2017-213000
628.
7. Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Firm Has Concluded Forensic Investigation of
Cybersecurity Incident, EQUIFAX (Oct. 2, 2017) https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com
/2017/10/02/equifax-announces-cybersecurity-firm-concluded-forensic-investigationcybersecurity-incident/.
8. Marian Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data is at Risk: Get Over It!, 19
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2016).
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. THE RISE OF DATA BREACHES
While technological advancements can have many benefits for modern
day consumers, these same technologies can create massive harm. 9 Today,
we live in a “big data” world. 10 Most consumers use credit cards and debit
cards, and personal information is regularly exchanged on websites every
day. 11 While this use of technology is certainly helpful, this modern-tech
world exacerbates the exposure of sensitive consumer information. 12
In simplest terms, a data breach “is an unauthorized disclosure of
personal information.” 13 More specifically, a data breach is an “an event in
which an individual name plus Social Security Number (SSN), driver’s
license number, medical record or a financial record/credit/debit card is
potentially put at risk-either in electronic or paper format.” 14 Unfortunately,
professional hackers, who are often the culprits in a data breach, are using
increasingly sophisticated technology to obtain data and then sell it on the
black market. 15
Data breaches are on the rise, both in prevalence and magnitude. 16
Despite an increase in regulatory scrutiny and more aggressive cybersecurity spending, the number of data breaches continues to rise. 17
According to the mid-year report by the Identity Theft Resource Center,
“The number of U.S. data breaches tracked through June 30, 2017, hit a
half-year high record of 791 . . . . This represents a significant jump of 29%
over 2016 figures during the same time period.” 18 In addition to an increase
in frequency, they have also increased in size. 19 This year, research has
found that the average size of data breaches has increased 1.8%. 20 These

9. “While this world is convenient, the numerous threats that are associated with [it] should
give people pause.” Id. at 5–6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Roberta Anderson, Viruses, Trojans, and Spyware, Oh My! The Yellow Brick Road to
Coverage in the Land of Internet Oz, 49 TORT & INS. L.J. 529, 536 (2014).
13. Tonia Klausner et al., Data Breach Litigation: Empirical Analysis and Current Trends,
PRIVACY ASS’N, (Nov. 6, 2013), https://iapp.org/media/presentations/13PPS/PPS13_
Defending_Data_Breach_PPT.pdf.
14. Data Breach Reporting, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idtheft/data-breaches.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
15. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 4.
16. Anderson, supra note 12 at 535 (“Over the last two years, some of the world’s most
sophisticated corporate giants have fallen victim to some of the largest data breaches in history.”).
17. Olga Kharif, 2016 Was a Record Year for Data Breaches, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 19,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-19/data-breaches-hit-record-in-2016-as
-dnc-wendy-s-co-hacked.
18. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 4.
19. INT’L BUS. MACHINES CORP., supra note 1, at 1.
20. Id.
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statistics confirm reality: data breaches, despite increased efforts to stop,
“are on the rise with unprecedented frequency, sophistication, and scale.” 21
B. CONSUMER PROTECTION
As data breaches continue to proliferate in our modern-day technologydriven society, a question of legal remedies becomes ever more pertinent.
Responses to several recent data breaches demonstrate that multiple
methods of recourse exist. 22 Home Depot, Target, and E-bay are amongst
many other large companies that have suffered data breaches where
consumers’ personal information was improperly exposed. 23
Typically, where consumers who have contracted with a company in
exchange for a service (i.e., a credit card company or bank) and sensitive
information is exposed as a consequence of a data breach, they come
together as a class and bring a suit against the company. 24 When attempting
to resolve these civil disputes, companies have attempted to evade litigation
by including mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts with
consumers. 25 These agreements require consumers to settle any disputes
they have with the business through arbitration, in which a disinterested
third-party rules on the matter, rather than going to court or joining a classaction suit. 26
Moreover, the provisions habitually include class action waivers that
“claims be brought in the ‘individual capacity,” and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” 27 The
Federal Arbitration Agreement (FAA) subsequently shut down any
opposition, as Congress made private agreements to resolve disputes
through arbitration “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 28 Until very

21. Anderson, supra note 12, at 532.
22. Id.
23. See generally Lorenzo Ligato, The 9 Biggest Data Breaches of All Time, HUFFINGTON

POST (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/biggest-worst-data-breacheshacks_us_55d4b5a5e4b07addcb44fd9e.
24. Currently, there are multiple circuit splits regarding whether plaintiff class members have
standing to bring claims for data breaches. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir.
2017) (holding that the plaintiff class did not have sufficient standing showing harm); cf. Attias v.
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiffs had sufficient standing to
bring the action for harm caused by the data breach). While extremely topical and important
regarding success in class action lawsuits, it is not the focus of this Note.
25. Often, these arbitration agreements are found within the fine print of agreements signed by
consumers. These arbitration agreements are most often used when people contract with
companies for credit cards or bank loans.
26. Jean Murray, Learn How the Arbitration Process Works, THE BALANCE (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-arbitration-process-how-does-arbitration-work-397420.
27. See e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011).
28. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947).
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recently, the Supreme Court continued to uphold arbitration and class
waiver provisions in consumer contracts under the FAA. 29
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, the Obama administration took
steps to prevent future financial disasters from occurring and began to shift
away from these consumer contract provisions.30 The administration
proposed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), to further regulate the financial markets and protect
consumers. 31 Additionally, the government formed the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (CFPB), an independent bureau to regulate consumer
finance. 32 Pursuant to section 1028(a) of Dodd-Frank, Congress mandated
the CFPB to study “the use of agreements providing for arbitration of any
future dispute . . . in connection with the offering or providing of consumer
financial products or services,” and to provide a report to Congress on the
same topic. 33 The statute also authorized the CFPB to implement consumer
financial contract regulations, consistent with the results of the study and
their report to Congress. 34
Based on their study, the CFPB proposed an “Arbitration Agreement”
(CFPB Rule or Rule). 35 The CFPB Rule prohibited “covered providers of
certain consumer financial products and services from using an agreement
with a consumer that provides for arbitration of any future dispute between
the parties to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class action
concerning the covered consumer financial product or service” and
“require[d] covered providers that are involved in an arbitration pursuant to
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to submit specified arbitral records to
the [CFPB].” 36 The CFPB Rule which substantially expanded protections
offered to consumers, was issued on July 19, 2017 and was set to come into
effect on March 19, 2018. 37
29. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352, 365 (holding that the FAA
preempts California’s judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts); see also Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–38(2013)
(holding that the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual class action waiver,
contained in mandatory merchant arbitration clauses, even if it would not be economically
practicable to maintain these actions individually).
30. Dodd-Frank at Five Years, Reforming Wall Street and Protecting Main Street, U.S. DEPT.
OF. TREAS. 1 (July 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/Documents/DFA%205%2
0Year%20Deck.pdf.
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 12
U.S.C. 5301 (124 Stat.) 1376 (2010).
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
33. CFPB, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act §1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2017) (authorizing the CFPB to regulate arbitration in a manner that it
determines to be “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”).
35. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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The CFPB Rule has been quite controversial. 38 With a change in
administration, the federal government was at odds over the Rule, and there
was vast divergence in opinion over the future of the Rule. 39 While
consumer advocacy groups strongly supported the CFPB Rule, 40 the U.S.
Department of Treasury expressed disapproval of the Rule in its October
23, 2017 report. 41 The Department of Treasury declared that the CFPB’s
study of arbitration was faulty. 42 Moreover, the Department of Treasury
stated that the Rule would impose extraordinary costs on businesses without
providing substantive relief to the consumer class members. 43
Shortly after the implementation of the CFPB Rule, efforts began to
repeal it using the Congressional Review Act (CRA). 44 First, the House of
Representatives voted to repeal the Rule. 45 On October 24, 2017, in a tight
vote, the Senate passed a joint resolution to repeal the Rule.46 Then, on
November 1, 2017, President Trump signed a joint resolution passed by
Congress removing the Rule under the CRA. 47 While the Rule had the
potential to vastly change the consumer-business relationship, under this
joint resolution, nullifying this rule, the CFPB Rule has no force or effect.48
Thus, to this day, arbitration clauses can still be used by companies to
mandate arbitration and bar class participation.

38. See generally C. Ryan Barber, Mayer Brown’s Andy Pincus, Ex-CFPB Attorney Deepak
Gupta Debate Arbitration Rule, THE NAT. L.J. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/09/25/pincus-gupta-on-cfpbs-arbitration-rule.
39. See Sylvan Lane, House Votes to Repeal Consumer Arbitration Rule, THE HILL (July 25,
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/343652-house-votes-to-repeal-consumer-financial-protecti
on-bureau-rule.
40. Donna Borak, et al., Senate Kills Rule that Made it Easier to Sue Banks, CNN (Oct. 25,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/24/politics/senate-cfpb-arbitration-repeal/index.html (stating
that consumer advocates considered the vote against the CFPB rule a “tremendous setback for
Americans”).
41. Limiting Consumer Choice, Expanding Costly Litigation: An Analysis of the CFPB
Arbitration Rule, U.S. DEPT. OF. TREAS. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/10-2317%20Analysis%20of%20CFPB%20arbitration%20rule.pdf.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id.
44. Under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, Congress can take procedures to establish
disapproval of regulatory rules issued by federal agencies, and can prevent the rule from taking
effect. See 5 U.S.C. § 801-808 (2017); see, e.g., Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996; compare with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 101 Stat.
847 (1996) (both acts included provisions allowing the President and Congress to more easily
nullify executive branch regulations).
45. Lane, supra note 39.
46. Borak, supra note 40.
47. Final Rule, CRA Revocation, 82 Fed. Reg. 224, 55500 (Nov. 22, 2017).
48. See id.
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II. CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES AND SUBSEQUENT DATA
BREACHES
In the United States, there are three major nationwide consumer credit
reporting agencies: Equifax Information Services LLC, TransUnion LLC,
and Experian Information Solutions.49 Credit reporting agencies collect,
compile, and report information about consumers in the form of credit
reports. 50 The credit reporting agencies then provide financial institutions
and businesses—that are authorized to obtain the information 51—a copy of
your credit report in order to make certain types of decisions about you. 52
For example, “when you apply for a new loan or credit card, a lender may
use the information in your credit report to determine whether to lend you
money and at what rate based on their own risk criteria.” 53 In addition to
serving businesses, these agencies sell credit monitoring and fraudprevention services directly to consumers. 54 However, due to the cyber
security incident, Equifax offered all U.S. consumers free identity theft
protection and credit file monitoring through Trusted-ID Premier,
complimentary for a year.55 Because these agencies are so widely used,
these companies hold an ample amount of personal and sensitive consumer
information. Therefore, when such information is exposed in a data breach,
a major problem occurs, as massive amounts of sensitive financial
information tumbles out in the open.
On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced a “cyber security incident”
where the agency’s internal system was hacked and accessed. 56 Equifax
determined that the data breach could have potentially impacted up to 143
million U.S. consumers. 57 Equifax announced that the company learned of
the breach on July 29, 2017, 58 and that the data breach occurred between
49. Key Dimensions and Processes in the U.S. Credit Reporting System, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU 2 (Dec. 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reportingwhite-paper.pdf.
50. Id.
51. Examples are credit card companies and loan lending banks.
52. How Does Credit Reporting Work?, EQUIFAX, https://help.equifax.com/s/article/ka137000
0009Fq1AAE/How-does-credit-reporting-work (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
53. Id.
54. See e.g., Equifax Products and Services, EQUIFAX, https://www.equifax.com/personal
/products/credit/monitoring-product-comparison/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
55. Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer Information, supra note 6.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. On August 1, 2017, a day after the company discovered the data breach, the CFO and
President sold a high amount of company stock that they owned. The company later issued a
statement claiming that neither of the company executives were aware of the breach at the time
they sold their shares. Equifax says execs unaware of hack when they sold stock, PHYS.ORG (Nov.
3, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-11-equifax-execs-unaware-hack-sold.html. However, the
Securities and Exchange Commission brought charges against a former Equifax executive for
insider trading. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Equifax Executive Charged
with Insider Trading (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-40.
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mid-May and July 2017, where criminals gained access to “names, Social
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver’s
license numbers.” 59 Additionally, Equifax determined that credit card
numbers for “approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain dispute
documents with personal identifying information for approximately
182,000 U.S. consumers were accessed.” 60 At the completion of Equifax’s
investigation, on October 2, 2017, Equifax determined that “approximately
2.5 million additional U.S. consumers were potentially impacted, for a total
of 145.5 million.” 61 In addition to this data breach being one of the largest
in magnitude, legal experts have opined that the Equifax data breach has
“wide reaching implications,” as there is real value in the financial
information obtained and that this is worse than other credit card data
breaches. 62
Equifax’s data breach differs from a typical data breach in several
ways. 63 Unlike most corporate data breaches, consumers do not need to
create an account or use Equifax’s services for Equifax to receive the
consumers’ personal information. 64 Equifax can receive consumers’
information regardless of any voluntary consent or business relationship
with Equifax itself because Equifax collects the data provided to it and
often purchases data from third parties. 65 This is due to the relationship
between various third parties and Equifax. In these instances, victims never
have control over whether to accept the risk of disclosure.
Typically, a compromised business that has been hacked (such as a
credit card company) offers free credit monitoring from one of the three
leading credit agencies, which are Equifax, Experian or TransUnion, to its
consumers. 66 “While that monitoring routinely comes with an arbitration
clause, consumers are not prevented by the service’s provision from suing
the breached company.” 67 For example, when Target was hacked in 2014,
the company offered customers free credit monitoring to the victims
through the credit reporting agency Experian. 68 Even though Experian had
59. Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer Information, supra note 6.
60. Id.
61. Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Firm Has Concluded Forensic Investigation of

Cybersecurity Incident, supra note 7.
62. Goodchild, supra note 3.
63. David Lazarus, The Real Outrage Isn’t Equifax’s Arbitration Clause – It’s All the Others,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarusequifax-arbitration-clauses-20170912-story.html.
64. Emily Marcum, Comment: Corporate Liability for Data Breaches: Will Equifax Victims
Have a Leg to Stand On?, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 525, 529 (2018).
65. Id.
66. Lazarus, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Jia Lynn Yang et al., Target says up to 70 million more customers were hit by
December data breach, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/target-says-70-million-customers-were-hit-by-dec-data-breach-more-than-first-
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an arbitration clause, the clause did not preempt lawsuits against Target,
and victims of the data breach still had a legal venue for compensation.69
Here, however, the situation is different. “Equifax’s breach is different in
that the company that got hacked and the one offering credit monitoring are
one and the same.” 70
Immediately after Equifax revealed the data breach, Equifax offered
free credit monitoring services through “Trusted-ID Premier,” where
consumers could check to see if their personal information was impacted. 71
However, this website to help consumers included a serious catch: “to join
Equifax’s free identity theft protection program, consumers were required
to agree to terms of service that included an arbitration clause and a class
action waiver that would prevent consumers from joining class actions
against the company.” 72 However, within days and due to extensive
exposure and criticism, 73 the company subsequently indicated “those
clauses do not apply to this cybersecurity incident or to the complimentary
Trusted-ID Premier offering.” 74
With the potential arbitration clause defense off the table, 75 floods of
class action lawsuits were filed against Equifax. 76 These class action

reported/2014/01/10/0ada1026-79fe-11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html?utm_term=.87c8a9
c9ebb8.
69. Lazarus, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Equifax Releases Details on Cybersecurity Incident, Announces Personnel Changes,
EQUIFAX (Sept. 15, 2017), https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-15-2017224018832. Additionally, it seems abundant that consumers would be weary of trusting the
company that led to the exposure of their personal information in the first place.
72. C. Ryan Barber, Equifax is Bashed for Forcing Arbitration on Consumers After Data
Breach, NAT. L. J. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/120279
7576871.
73. See Diana Hembree, Consumer Backlash Spurs Equifax To Drop ‘Ripoff Clause’ in Offer
To Security Hack Victims, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembre
e/2017/09/09/consumer-anger-over-equifaxs-ripoff-clause-in-offer-to-security-hack-victimsspurs-policy-change/#1d80a51f6e7e.
74. Equifax Releases Details on Cybersecurity Incident, Announces Personnel Changes, supra
note 71.
75. Although Equifax originally announced that they would not apply its arbitration clause and
class action waiver for this data breach, the congressional repeal of the CFPB’s arbitration rule
raises this issue once again. See Final Rule, CRA Revocation, supra note 47.
76. Kevin McCoy, Equifax Hit With At Least 23 Class-Action Lawsuits Over Massive
Cyberbreach, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2017/09/11/equifax-hit-least-23-class-action-lawsuits-over-massivecyberbreach/653909001. Subsequent to learning of the arbitration clause, “a coalition of 70
consumer, legal and community organizations called Fair Arbitration Now released a statement
lambasting the proposal.” See Andrew Blake, Equifax Updates Terms of Service After Arbitration
Clause Causes Uproar Following Massive Breach, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/9/equifax-updates-terms-service-afterarbitration-cl. “New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman called the terms of service
‘unacceptable and unenforceable,’ and said Equifax removed it by mid-afternoon Friday following
conversations with his office.” Id.
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lawsuits increased steadfastly, after the Apache Software Foundation 77
released a statement indicating that Equifax received notice of the
vulnerability that caused the breach, as well as instructions to fix the
vulnerability, in March 2017. 78 Based on this security revelation, it seems
the data breach could have been avoided altogether.
Consumers filed over sixty different class action lawsuits against
Equifax Inc. and Equifax Information Services, LLC. 79 Also, credit unions
began to sue Equifax. 80 The city of Chicago brought a suit against Equifax
on behalf of Illinois citizens that have potentially suffered harm from the
breach. 81These class action suits are “predicated on the theory
that Equifax’s cyber security was inadequate, that the company knew or
should have known of this inadequacy, and that it failed to take action to
correct the inadequacy to the detriment of consumers.” 82
In addition to numerous consumer actions, plaintiffs brought a class
action securities suit against Equifax, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission brought charges against Equifax personnel. 83 The securities
suit alleges damages based on the 17% percent drop in Equifax’s share
price after the breach disclosure. 84 Due to the pervasive effect of the data
breach and alleged negligence by the companies’ agents, Equifax must
combat a string of lawsuits.

77. The vulnerability that hackers exploited to access Equifax’s information was in the Apache
Struts web-application software. The Apache Software Foundation Confirms Equifax Data Breach
Due to Failure to Install Patches Provided for Apache® Struts™ Exploit, APACHE SOFTWARE
(Sept. 14, 2017). https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/media-alert-the-apache-software.
78. Id.
79. Corrado Rizzi, Here’s Every Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against Equifax So Far,
CLASSACTION.ORG, https://www.classaction.org/blog/heres-every-class-action-lawsuit-filed-again
st-equifax-so-far (last updated Mar. 15, 2018).
80. Tina Orem, CUNA: More than 500 CU’s Discuss Class Action Law Suit Against Equifax,
CREDIT UNION TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.cutimes.com/2017/10/04/cuna-more-than-500cus-discuss-class-action-lawsui.
81. Becky Yerak, Chicago Sues Equifax Over Data Breach: ‘A Financial Fraud was
Committed Here’, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-biz-chicago-sues-equifax-0929-story.html.
82. Shari Claire Lewi & Amanda R. Gurman, Equifax: Why this Data Breach is Different from
All the Others, 23 No. 15 WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIAB. 1, 2 (2017).
83. Press Release, Former Equifax Executive Charged With Insider Trading, supra note 58;
Kevin LaCroix, Equifax Data Breach Litigation Now Includes Securities Suit, THE D&O DIARY
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/09/articles/cyber-liability/equifax-data-breac
h-litigation-now-includes-securities-suit/.
84. Lewi & Gurman, supra note 82, at 2.
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CLASS ACTION REMEDY VS. ARBITRATION
A. CLASS ACTION REMEDY
1. Benefits of Class Action Remedy

Beyond the fact that class action lawsuits provide relief for those who
have suffered some sort of harm, there are many additional benefits to
participating in a class action lawsuit where your data—in a consumer
capacity—has been breached. Class actions ”allow many potential plaintiffs
to join their claims and share the cost of litigation when each has suffered
injury at the hands of the same party and in a similar manner.” 85 Likewise,
this cost-saving benefit has gained support. The Supreme Court has held
that class actions promote efficiency in that the “device saves the resources
of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially
affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion
under Rule 23.” 86
Additionally, class action litigation provides recourse for consumers
who would otherwise not be able to avail themselves of any other remedy. 87
The Supreme Court has agreed with this reasoning, as class actions for
small harms provide a mechanism for compensating individuals where “the
amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would
be impracticable.” 88 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, for example, the
California Supreme Court reasoned that because “damages in consumer
cases are often small,” without the availability of class actions, there would
be no way to stop companies from wrongfully extracting small amounts
from consumers. 89 In the situation where a consumer’s data has been
breached, the value of the breach may be relatively small. 90 The ability to
aggregate similar small claims gives the “potential plaintiffs access to the

85. Cara Van Dorn, When Joining Means Enforcing: Giving Consumer Protection Agencies
Authority to Ban the Use of Class Action Waivers,17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L.
245, 256 (2017).
86. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a class action to be maintained under certain conditions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
87. See Van Dorn, supra note 85.
88. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment) (stating that a class action may be justified under
Federal Rule 23 where “the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the
action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for
individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable.”). See also id. at 617
(citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he policy
at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her own
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”).
89. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).
90. Van Dorn, supra note 85, at 256.
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justice system when the damages incurred by each plaintiff alone would not
justify the time, effort, and expense of bringing an individual action.” 91
As a remedy, class actions benefit consumers because their structure
and effect encourage lawyers to take these cases. 92 In class action lawsuits,
“[p]laintiffs’ attorneys typically work on a contingency fee basis,” where
lawyers only receive compensation if they win and their compensation is a
percentage of the amount won. 93 Therefore, a clear incentive exists for
lawyers to participate and work to get the best settlement for the class, as
they can reap substantial benefit themselves. Due to this contingency fee
basis and the fee structure, “the cost and risk of litigation are only logically
justified if the potential damages are high. In a class action, an attorney can
earn legal fees from multiple clients, making even small-dollar claims
financially feasible to pursue.” 94 If, in order to obtain relief, data breach
cases were required to be litigated individually, victims may encounter
trouble obtaining representation, as the case may not be worth an attorney’s
time. 95
Lastly, class action lawsuits can also serve as a major deterrent by
discouraging future bad behavior. 96 “The threat of costly class litigation
provides a potent incentive for companies to comply with regulations and
avoid harmful or even risky behavior.” 97 With the threat of future litigation,
companies will likely work harder to stop future data breaches from
occurring; therefore, class action litigation serves as a beneficial deterrent.98
The advantages of class action are especially applicable to consumer
data breach victims. First, data breach victims’ claims individually are quite
small, as “the dollar value of an injury sustained due to compromised
names, addresses, credit and debit card numbers, social security numbers,
and other ‘run-of-the-mill’ personal information is usually quite small—less
than $99 for most.” 99 Therefore, victims can take advantage of the class
action structure, and lawyers will be keen to take on the case.
2. Problems with Class Action Remedy
Due to the fact that the CFPB Rule was overturned under the CRA, it is
unclear whether class action litigation will continue to prevail or perish
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See id. at 258.
Id. at 258–59.
Id.
See id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Brian Fitzpatrick follows the theory of deterrence where class action litigation serves as an
important role because they deter corporate wrongdoing. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class
Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 202 (Vanderbilt L. Res. Paper No. 17-40, 202 (2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3020282.
99. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 6.
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within consumer-business agreements and affect data breach claims.
Additionally, while there are many benefits to class action litigation, there
are also multiple negative consequences. One major problem with class
action litigation as a remedy is that the victims do not actually fare that well
in terms of total relief granted. 100 Opponents argue that the cost of class
action suits far exceed the benefits. 101 Due to the large size of class
members and the fact that data breach class actions often are consolidated
under the multidistrict litigation statute, victims do not actually obtain
substantive relief once divided amongst all class members. 102 Due to the
sprawling nature of the Equifax data breach, the size of the class will likely
be great, thus subsequent relief will likely be trivial.
In class action litigation, it is common for the individual plaintiff’s class
action recovery to be highly disproportionate to the class action attorney’s
compensation. 103 Attorney fees to class counsel often exceed total class
compensation. 104 This is because the relief available to plaintiffs, by way of
class action litigation, differs substantially from what the plaintiffs can
actually recover.105 Commentators argue that “class actions serve the
interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys more than those of plaintiffs themselves.” 106
This inherent imbalance between compensation attributable to the plaintiffs’
attorneys and the percentage of settlement value available to plaintiffs
clearly demonstrates that class action litigation may not be the most
appropriate method of achieving compensation for consumers. 107
Given the lucrative legal fees for counsel in a large class action suit, a
conflict of interest can arise. In other words, there is a clear “conflict of
interest between class counsel, whose pecuniary interest is in their fees, and
class members, whose pecuniary interest is in the award to the class.” 108
Some commentators have argued that this conflict of interest leads
plaintiffs’ lawyers to “agree to settlements that better serve [his or her] own
interests—and the defendants who should be their adversaries—than those

100. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. MARY L. REV. 1, 34 (2000).
101. Id. at 35.
102. Multidistrict litigation is a federal legal procedure designed to speed the process of
handling complex cases. Under the statute, where “civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts,” a “Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation”
decides which cases should be consolidated. 28 U.S.C. §1407 (1968).
103. DEPT. OF TREASURY, LIMITING CONSUMER CHOICE, EXPANDING COSTLY LITIGATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CFPB ARBITRATION RULE 4 (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/10-2317%20Analysis%20of%20CFPB%20arbitration%20rule.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Sternlight, supra note 100, at 34.
107. DEPT. OF TREASURY, LIMITING CONSUMER CHOICE, supra note 103, at 1.
108. Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014).
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of class members.” 109 Moreover, because the stakes can be low for some of
the victims in such class actions, there is no one monitoring the decisions of
the class counsel, and the counsel is therefore even more at liberty to make
decisions regarding the suit based on their own interests. 110
Ultimately, “[g]iven the conflicts of interest inherent in class actions
and given the high costs of class litigation, individuals might be better off
giving up the possible deterrence or other benefits of a class action in return
for reduced dispute resolution costs.” 111 Therefore, when all is said and
done, the consumer may actually receive less in a class action settlement
than they are entitled to due to the attorney’s conflict of interest. Thus, the
consumer may never receive just compensation.
On top of lacking substantive benefits to consumers, class action
litigation can also be extremely detrimental to businesses. 112 The cost of
“‘frivolous’ litigation” 113 remains high. 114 This litigation is the result of
defendants frequently settling large class action lawsuits unrelated to the
merits of the claim. 115 “[H]owever legally untenable the claim or defense
may be, a nuisance-value strategy can be profitable when it costs less to
initiate the claim or defense than it does to seek its dismissal.” 116
Consequently, defendants are pushed into settling potentially unmeritorious
claims simply to avoid excessive costs and time spent litigating class action
suits. 117
Applying class action litigation as a remedy to major data breaches can
be even further damaging. In addition to the cost of litigation, before any
recovery is even considered, companies that have suffered a data breach
already encounter enormous costs. 118 After a data breach is discovered,
companies incur substantial expenses related to notification
requirements. 119 “These costs include the creation of contact databases,
109. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 79 (1st ed. 2000).
110. Id.
111. Sternlight, supra note 100, at 35.
112. This argument is especially relevant to publicly traded companies; where a company
suffers a data breach and is toppled with litigation, the price of its stock may subsequently drop.
Not only does the consumer victims and the company suffer, but any stockholders may suffer by
the drop of the stock price.
113. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2004).
114. Id.
115. In general, large class action lawsuits are almost always settled, and very rarely go to trial.
See Mayer Brown LLP, Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical Analysis of Class
Actions, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 1–2, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/
1/Class_Action_Study.pdf.
116. Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 1851.
117. See id.
118. See generally, PONEMON INST., supra note 1 (listing and categorizing the varied costs
associated with data breaches).
119. Anderson, supra note 12, at 539.
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determination of all regulatory requirements, engagement in outside
experts, postal expenditures, email bounce-backs, and inbound
communication setups.” 120According to the Penomon Institute’s Cost of
Data Breach Study, notification costs are the highest in the United States, in
comparison to other countries. 121 These notification costs are just one of
many exorbitant costs required of Equifax.
In addition to these notification requirements, companies have to spend
an enormous amount of money on post-data breach response. 122 These postdata breach response activities include “help desk activities, in bound
communications, special investigative activities, remediation, legal
expenditures, product discounts, 123 identity protection services, and
regulatory interventions.” 124 After a data breach, before recourse for those
affected is even considered, a company has already been impeded with
expensive notification and post-data breach response costs. 125
Applying class action litigation to the Equifax data breach will be
extremely damaging to Equifax as a corporation and a business. Studies
have found that, the more records lost, the higher the cost of the data
breach. 126 Because the Equifax data breach affected approximately 145
million people, the costs associated with the breach are already very high. 127
While protecting the victims and making sure that there is a system in place
for them to obtain relief is of the utmost concern, the fact that this was not
an intentional act, despite any alleged negligence on behalf of Equifax, and
that the cooperation of the company is of value to the victims and society,
the interests of the company cannot be completely disregarded.
Additionally, the Equifax data breach is different than most other data
breaches as the exposure was far more expansive, in that it affected both
businesses and consumers alike. 128 “[U]nlike previous breaches, where
harm fell squarely on consumers whose personal data was let loose into the
wild, . . . the Equifax breach could trigger a shift in plaintiffs’ class actions
from potential harm to consumers to potential harm to businesses as a result
120.
121.
122.
123.

PONEMON INST., supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
Id.
In addition to ordinary data breach costs, Equifax provided the free credit monitoring
service, Trusted-ID Premier. Normally, these consumers or companies contracting with Equifax
pay for these credit-monitoring services.
124. PONEMON INST., supra note 1. The study also determined that the United States spends the
most on post data breach response. Id.
125. Despite the excess cost of data breaches, many companies failed to adopt cyber security
insurance. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 533.
126. PONEMON INST., supra note 1, at 3.
127. Stacy Caplow, Equifax Faces Mounting Costs and Investigations from Breach, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/business/equifax-data-breach.html.
128. See Eduard Goodman, The Equifax Data Breach and its Impact on Businesses, LAW360
(Sept. 14, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/963870/the-equifax-data-breach-andits-impact-on-businesses.
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of the breach.” 129 Therefore, because of the sprawling use of Equifax and
other credit reporting agencies, both consumers and businesses may sue
Equifax. 130 With the potential of limitless liability, it is unclear whether
Equifax will be able to absorb these new financial burdens and whether
these costs will instead be pushed off onto consumers. Because of the high
costs and inequities for class members, and because endless lawsuits could
put too much strain on Equifax, which we have established we require their
cooperation, class action litigation should not be the default legal remedy in
the Equifax data breach or breaches of similar nature.
B. Arbitration
While use of an arbitration clause has become moot in the Equifax data
breach because the company will not seek to apply its arbitration clause and
class action waiver, arbitration as a remedy may be a potential recourse in
future data breaches. 131 Therefore, the question remains as to whether
arbitration should be the legal remedy in a data breach similar to
Equifax’s. 132
Arbitration as a means of a remedy in consumer disputes really took
ground once Congress codified a policy favoring private dispute resolution
and subsequently passed the FAA in 1925. 133 Under the FAA, written
agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 134 As the Supreme Court continued to uphold arbitration
provisions, a majority of businesses included them in their consumerbusiness contracts. 135 There is extensive debate on whether arbitration
clauses should be used in consumer contracts. 136
129. Id.
130. See Renae Marie, After the Breach, Equifax Now Faces the Lawsuits, WASH. POST. (Sept.

22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/22/after-the-breachequifax-now-faces-the-lawsuits/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6efa326f2f99 (noting that Madisonbased Summit Credit Union may be the first of many financial institutions to bring a lawsuit
against Equifax.)
131. While the Equifax data breach was the biggest in magnitude, it is not the first credit bureau
agency data breach. In October 2015, Experian, a credit reporting agency, suffered a major data
breach that potentially exposed 15 million consumers who had contracted with T-Mobile. Robert
Hackett, Experian Data Breach Affects 15 Million People Including T-Mobile Customers,
FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2017), http://fortune.com/2015/10/01/experian-data-breach-tmobile/. Moreover,
while many efforts have been taken to attempt to rectify the data breach problem, it is inevitable
that these types of data breaches will continue in the future. Data Breach Reporting, supra note
14.
132. Because Congress repealed the CFBA’s Arbitration Rule, credit consumer agencies may
attempt to uphold arbitration agreements in future data breach claims.
133. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947).
134. Id.
135. The Future of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, JONES DAY LLP (Nov. 2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/141bd3d6-06e5-487e-8fd4fe8c6ee585a3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2bb9bb69-4425-4d7a-9ff5-
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1. Benefits Associated with Arbitration
Arbitration is “a means of dispute resolution intended to help
consumers and businesses save time and money and achieve fair results
when compared to traditional litigation.” 137 Moreover, it follows the policy
of genuine freedom to contract, derived from the U.S. Constitution.138
Additionally, it furthers the argument that because arbitration is a “creature
of contract,” the parties of the agreement can design the process to
accommodate their respective needs.139 The benefit of arbitration is that it
offers a system of fast, efficient dispute resolution for both consumers and
companies, as opposed to lengthier litigation. 140
Additionally, arbitration resolves the issue of class action litigation
where lawyers file potentially frivolous claims knowing that the chance of
the case settling will be very high. 141 In this regard, arbitration is especially
beneficial to the business as it often deters lawyers from filing nuisance
suits in hopes of scoring a massive settlement. 142 Moreover, it will assure
that only those that have suffered damage from the data breach will receive
compensation.
2. Problems associated with Arbitration
A major problem associated with mandatory arbitration agreements
between consumers and companies is the high levels of misconception
amongst consumers. 143 Often consumers do not realize they are giving up
their rights, or alternatively, they fail to understand what giving up their
rights even means. 144 In some instances, pre-dispute arbitration agreements
are included in the fine print of a contract between a consumer and a
company, and issues of notice and consent arise. 145 Because contracts can
be both very lengthy and complex, many consumers do not read what they

6de73e0517cc/Future%20of%20Mandatory%20Consumer%20Arbitration%20Clauses.pdf;
Arbitration Agreements, supra note 35.
136. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871,
871 (2008).
137. The Future of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 135.
138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
139. Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for Commercial Disputes,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/March_
2012_Sussman_Wilkinson_March_5.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
140. See id.
141. Lazarus, supra note 63.
142. Id.
143. Jeff Sovern, Arbitration Clauses Trap Consumers with Fine Print, AM. BANKER (Dec. 2,
2014),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/arbitration-clauses-trap-consumers-with-fineprint.
144. Id.
145. Lazarus, supra note 63.
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are signing or clicking. 146 Likewise, because businesses rarely point out the
arbitration agreement or attempt to explain it to the consumers they are
contracting with, consumers are not even aware of the agreements that they
are making. 147 Most consumers do not even know that they are prohibited
from commencing litigation and are required to use arbitration. 148
Arbitration is also fundamentally unfair due to the inherent lack of
bargaining power between the parties. 149 While proponents contend that
arbitration offers more party control, in fact, in consumer agreements, only
the business benefits from any such party control because of the unequal
bargaining power between the major business and the consumer. 150
Beyond the argument that arbitration agreements lack fairness, the
arbitration process is also arguably unfair as opponents contend that
arbitration as a means of resolution overwhelmingly favors the company,
and fails to adequately protect the consumers. 151 Studies by the advocacy
group Public Citizen found that “over a four-year period, arbitrators ruled in
favor of banks and credit card companies 94% of the time in disputes with
California consumers.” 152 With this apparent bias, consumers fail to obtain
fairness and justice in cases where they in fact suffered harm from the
business.
Arbitration is also less impartial. 153 When using arbitration, the parties
choose their arbitrator. 154 Therefore, this ability can benefit the parties (but
can also hurt another party) to an arbitration agreement. 155 Moreover,
because parties choose the arbitrators and they are not randomly assigned
(like a judge), arbitrators must compete for business with other
arbitrators. 156 This competition “gives arbitrators the incentive to make
decisions that benefit the parties to the agreement, so as to increase the
likelihood that the arbitrator will be selected in the future.” 157 Therefore,
where there is an abundance of disputes against financial businesses, the
arbitrators, for the sake of business, have the clear incentive to make
decisions in favor of the financial company, as opposed to the consumers. 158
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (noting that “fewer than 7% of consumers understood that an arbitration clause in their

credit card agreements meant they couldn’t sue the company — which is to say that about 93%
didn’t understand the provision.”).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. As opposed to litigation, where the judge is typically assigned randomly.
155. Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 709
(2001).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Lazarus, supra note 63.
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Furthermore, the company in a dispute pays the arbitrator’s fee.159 Clearly
“the arbitrator thus has a financial incentive to favor one side over the
other.” 160 Although there are many benefits to arbitration, because of the
inherent unfairness to consumers, arbitration, as it stands today, should not
be the legal recourse in most consumer-business disputes, specifically
major data breaches within credit reporting agencies.
IV. SUGGESTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
A. VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS
Due to the apparent disadvantages associated with class action litigation
and arbitration remedies, a data breach compensation fund would better
reach the goal of compensating victims, while also limiting the costs and
time associated with meritless or under-compensated litigation. 161
Victim compensation funds are created to administer funds to those
who have suffered an injury from a certain event. Victim recovery funds
come in a variety of different forms. These funds can be either private or
public, or a combination of both. 162 Recovery funds can be created in the
settlement of litigation from which payments are made pursuant to an
administered payout proceeding. 163 Alternatively, recovery funds can be
created by statute, where it is “funded at least in part by private
industry in exchange for immunity from or limitations on civil liability, to
pay for injuries caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of a
company.” 164 Here, the former is applicable, as litigation against Equifax
has already ensued. 165
Victim recovery funds have had huge success in the United States. The
first and most widely-known type of fund is workers’ compensation funds
for employees injured while on the job.166 Prior to state-enacted workers’
compensation laws, the only remedy for employees hurt on the job was to
sue in court. Eventually, states began to implement laws and create funds

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 37.
See id. at 38. For example, social welfare funds, such as Social Security and Welfare are
paid entirely by taxpayers and administered by the Federal Social Security Administration. By
contrast, other funds are paid by private or public insurance. See id.
163. See, e.g., Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and
Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 898 (1998) (noting the successful tobacco
industry settlement fund that settled the major lawsuit for associated health care costs).
164. See Riedy & Manus, supra note 8, at 38.
165. However, in other instances, a statute-created fund can also be applicable in data breach
cases.
166. See generally History of the New York State Workers Compensation Board, WORKERS
COMPENSATION BOARD, http://www.wcb.ny.gov/content/main/TheBoard/history.jsp (last visited
Sept. 14, 2018).
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where injured employees could seek redress. 167 These funds are no-fault
funds, which allow employees injured at work to obtain payment for lost
wages and medical costs, without regard to any personal negligence or
fault. 168 While workers’ compensation, which employees pay into, is an
ongoing fund, other recovery funds have been created after a “triggering”
event where injury has spread amongst many people. 169 Two highlyregarded funds that were created for both September 11th victims 170 and BP
oil spill victims 171 can be used as a model for a recovery fund for victims of
the Equifax data breach.
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is an example of a
fund created in exchange for restrictions on any further liability of the
defendant to the victim. 172 Congress created the fund, which was financed
by both taxpayer dollars and airline industry money. 173 The airlines
provided a significant portion of the funds in exchange for restrictions on
liability to the victims. 174 The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
compensated victims (or victims’ families) in exchange for their agreement
not to sue the airline corporations involved. 175 Under the conditions of the
recovery fund, if the victim or the victim’s family chose to take the offer,
they could not bring suit against any defendants allegedly responsible for
the event. If they chose not to take the offer, the victim could appeal. 176 The
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was highly successful, as “an
estimated 97% of affected families chose to accept the award offer rather
than pursue litigation.” 177
Similarly, a victim compensation fund was created after the 2010
massive BP oil spill. 178 BP created a trust fund with $20 billion dollars
placed in an escrow account to compensate victims of the Deepwater

167. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and the Econ. Structure of
Workers Comp. Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 776–79 (1982).
168. See generally History of the New York State Workers Compensation Board, supra note
166.
169. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 43.
170. On September 11, 2001, a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks occurred in the
United States, leaving thousands dead and many more injured. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8,
at 41.
171. On April 20, 2010, an explosion rocked the Deepwater Horizon Drilling rig in the Gulf of
Mexico. Shannon L. Sole, BP’s Compensation Fund: A Buoy for Both Claimants and BP, 37 J.
CORP. L. 245, 247 (2011). As a consequence, 4 million barrels of oil leaked into the Gulf of
Mexico—the largest spill in American History. The spill had massive environmental, economic,
and social consequences. Id.
172. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 41.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Sole, supra note 171, at 252.
176. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 41–42.
177. Sole, supra note 171, at 252.
178. See generally id. at 246.
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Horizon Spill. 179 The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) has assumed
responsibility for processing claims and claimants could seek compensation
only through the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. 180 Similar to the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund, claimants would have to surrender their
rights to sue BP to receive payments of compensation.181 When the BP fund
was modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, it was
“intended to be an expeditious, reliable alternative to tens of thousands of
tort cases, sparing plaintiffs and the company alike the expense and
uncertainty of drawn-out lawsuits.” 182
The successes of both funds derive from Kenneth Feinberg, who, as the
Special Master, 183 allocated the fund to victims. 184 The purpose of these
types of funds is to attempt to compensate victims and avoid protracted
litigation.185 Kenneth Feinberg believes the proposed success of a victim
recovery fund derives from a uniformity approach and a streamlined
process. 186
These recovery funds have characteristics in common. While the
injuries within each fund vastly differ, 187 the characteristics of the victims
are all similar. 188 The victims’ “harms were unexpected and were not a
result of their own actions.” 189Additionally, these compensation funds
protect “putative defendants from civil liability from ‘wrongful’ acts or
omissions when the primary causative agent was a force, largely or entirely,

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
GCCF Final Rules Governing Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria,
and Final Payment Methodology, GCCF (Feb. 18, 2011), http:// www.gulfcoastcla
imsfacility.com/FINAL_RULES.pdf. The Final Rules implement a slightly different
compensation scheme than was initially in place. See Editorial, Mr. Feinberg and the Gulf
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at A18 (describing the GCCF compensation scheme
enacted shortly after the spill). Under the previous scheme, claimants could apply for an
“emergency advance payment,” an accelerated form of compensation available to individuals and
businesses that paid out up to six month’s lost income to any legitimate claimant, or a “final
payment,” which would compensate claimants for long-term damages. Id.
183. A special master is one who oversees the recovery fund and administers the payouts. See
Editorial, Mr. Feinberg and the Gulf Settlement, supra note 182.
184. Kenneth Feinberg is an American attorney, specializing in mediation and alternative
dispute resolution and is widely known for his success as serving as special master in
compensating victims where necessary.
185. GCCF FAQs, GCCF (Aug. 11, 2010), https://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files
/imported_pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf.
186. See generally KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED
EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 184 (PublicAffairs 2006) (examining the
difficulties of determining compensation for victims of 9/11).
187. While some victims suffered physical injuries (for example, 9/11 and Workers
Compensation), other victims suffered economic injuries (BP Oil Spill, and Equifax data breach).
188. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 42.
189. Id. at 42.
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out of the defendants’ control.” 190 Lastly, these funds are typically created
after a “triggering” event which caused the harm. 191
These three characteristics are similar to the facts in the Equifax data
breach. Here, there is nothing these victims could have done to prevent the
breach from occurring because the information was no longer in the
consumers’ hands, but in the hands of Equifax (and the hackers). 192 Second,
with regard to culpability, although Equifax had a duty to protect
consumers’ personal information, the breach was not an intentional act but
was done so at the hands of an unknown criminal actor. 193 In this case,
Equifax, like many other businesses and organizations, including
governmental agencies, did not stop the hacking from taking place. While
Equifax should not be relieved of liability, it was not an intentional act and
should at least be recognized as such. Lastly, the data breach was clearly the
triggering event that caused any damage. Because the Equifax data breach
shares common characteristics of other events that resulted in successful
victim recovery funds, the likelihood of a victim recovery fund’s success
heightens. Thus, in contrast to the aforementioned downsides of class
actions or arbitrators, victim funds produce positive outcomes and should
therefore be the preferred remedial method.
B. BENEFITS OF A COMPENSATION FUND OVER OTHER LEGAL
RECOURSES
A recovery fund as a compensation alternative to private litigation has
many substantial benefits. The benefit of an administrated compensation
method trumps private litigation because the fund can be designed to make
compensation simpler and more efficient. 194 Who can recover and how
much they can recover can be straightforward and less adversarial. 195
Moreover, both corporations and claimants benefit from the “certainty and
stability” that a compensation program offers. 196 Additionally, both
claimants and businesses encounter much lower transaction costs. 197
Victim compensation funds can benefit victims where they are
compensated more fairly than if they opted for traditional class action
litigation. For victims, making a claim to a victim compensation fund can
be simple and inexpensive. 198 If properly created and conducted, in victim
190. Id. at 43.
191. Id. While Workers’ Compensation Boards do not apply to this last category, many other

victim recovery funds are created after a certain event and therefore is a similar character of these
types of funds.
192. See, e.g., id. at 44.
193. In this instance, an unknown hacker.
194. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 38–39.
195. Id. at 39.
196. Sole, supra note 171, at 260.
197. Id.
198. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 39.
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recovery funds, it is relatively simple to determine whether making a claim
is justified. 199 And “the claimant will know, in advance, within reasonable
limits, what to expect.” 200 Claimants face lower hurdles to compensation
under such a program, which provides “an easy, simple burden of proof.” 201
Additionally, the claim resolution process will be much timelier than
litigation because the fund avoids the cumbersome processes and “slowturning wheels of justice dispensed through litigation.” 202 Moreover, “the
satisfaction of the claim is not dependent on external forces over which the
victim has no control, such as which party has access to the best expert
witnesses, or a jury’s secret deliberations.” 203 In summary, a recovery fund
administered to victims “cover more cases, faster, more efficiently, and
more predictably than tort — so as to improve compensation.” 204 In
addition to the countless benefits to the victims, these funds are also a better
alternative for the companies. Compensation awards, a major cost for
breached entities, can be predicted more precisely beforehand, saving time
and therefore ultimately saving money. 205
As there are substantial benefits of an administrative remedy, the proper
legal remedy for the Equifax data breach should be a victim recovery fund,
created like previous funds after injury-causing events. 206 The fund should
be coordinated through an independent body, like the GCCF, to determine
compensation. 207 Moreover, a Special Master with expertise in correctly
compensating victims, like Kenneth Feinberg, should run the independent
body. 208 Like the GCCF, victims must provide documentation to show that
they have suffered harm. 209 Moreover, the aim of the fund should be the
same as the aim of the BP fund, which was to minimize lawsuits against the
company. 210 In order to be considered for the compensation fund
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Sole, supra note 171, at 260.
Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 39.
Id.
Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients
Safer: “Avoidable Classes of Events” are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478, 483
(2005).
205. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 40.
206. How much money Equifax should put in the fund, and how it will be funded are very
important issues in regard to the success of the Fund. This amount should be determined based on
extensive research done by the independent body afforded the role of distributing the money.
207. See, e.g., GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017).
208. See, e.g., Frances Romero, Compensation Czar Kenneth Feinberg, TIME (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1903547,00.html.
209. The issue of proximate cause (i.e., did the Equifax data breach cause the harm, or was the
information breached through another avenue?) still persists; however, this is still remains a
stronger alternative than class action litigation.
210. Niel King, Jr., Feinberg Ramps Up $20 Billion Compensation Fund, WALL. ST. J. (June
21,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704256304575321072301455
004.html?KEYWORDS=bp+compensation+fund.
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individual data breach victims would be required to file a claim with the
fund before filing a lawsuit directly against the company. 211 Alternatively,
the victim could voluntarily choose to pursue a lawsuit directly against
the hacker. 212 However, like other victim compensation funds, instead of
requiring exhaustion of the fund, the fund can be optional, where the
decision is up to the victims as to whether to make a claim with the fund or
proceeding directly to court. 213 Then, however, the incentives of opting for
the fund over joining a class action lawsuit must be clearly articulated to the
victims. Regardless of the form and implementation, 214 the goal of a victim
recovery fund is to find a middle ground between Equifax, or other
businesses, and the consumer victims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons stated above, class action litigation and arbitration
can be faulty avenues for legal recourse where consumers have suffered
from damages massive data breaches. If the default legal remedy is class
action litigation, the company will suffer excessively while the consumer
will not even fare that well. By contrast, if the default rule is mandatory predispute arbitration, consumers will likely suffer. While it appears at this
point, that class action litigation is the most popular avenue, this option will
only be excessively costly for Equifax, while failing to adequately provide
timely or substantive recovery to victims. 215 Instead, a data breach
compensation fund would better reach the goal of compensating true
victims, while also limiting the costs associated with litigation.216
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211. See Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 45.
212. See id. at 45. This exclusion will likely little practical consequence, however there may be
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213. Id. at 45.
214. The fund’s overall structure requires more extensive research and expertise.
215. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 8, at 37.
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